Omnipresence: Philosophy of Philosophies

  (Disclaimer: these are just thoughts/reflections based on appraised and published philosophy pieces.)

    I have a habit of looking for parallels and analogies, in order to understand complex ideas, between different fields and areas of studies. I like philosophy, I thoroughly enjoy it. However, my brain is too small that most of the time- I have no idea what I'm reading when I read a philosophy piece. So, like all small and adaptive brains, mine immediately starts looking for patterns in other simpler areas- one of them being, Religion. Ahhh yes, religion. I hate it and I've learned to love it because of how elementary it has become to my understanding. What people in many religions across the globe refer to as deities, God, the "unknown" that lies behind the doctrine of rebirth and reincarnation, I have come to understand simply as THE energy with consciousness; the one unchanging and eternal thing that all other things come from, it has to exist outside of time. In this essay, I've compiled a series of reflective sessions that I've had at different times based on certain pieces I've read, and almost always- cross referencing them. This will be the first compilation. If I have more late on, I will create a new series. Best of luck to me, and best of luck to you!

FINDING THE SELF

Daniel Dennet describes an experience he had with an opportunity that came from the Pentagon, where he was asked to travel through the earth to the other side. In order to do so, his brain must be taken out temporarily as there exists a certain radioactive material that only affects the brain within his specific mode of earth piercing transportation. Upon waking up post surgery, Dennet stands outside the transparent capsule that held his brain in a particular liquid- keeping it functioning until his return. As he stood and stared, he became conflicted- because even as he was staring at his brain, he was able to think. So what was doing the thinking? Is Dennet his brain? or his body? Dennet then proceeded to name his brain Yorrick, and his body, Hamlet, and himself as just Dennet. Where does Dennet exists?

“I am where Hamlet (body) is” 

FOR: Hamlet is the makeup of how Dennet identifies himself in the world, how he is represented, what he looks like. If people who knew Dennet were to address Dennet, they would look for Hamlet, because Hamlet is the physical embodiment of Dennet’s identity. It is not a construct but it is the external tell-sign people can respond to. Its the same reason why people mistake identical twins all the time. When we, on the outside, look for Dennet- what we really look for is Hamlet. Hamlet is where Dennet is. 

AGAINST: Philosophers have rejected this notion many times, through the simple explanation of brain transplants. If the brain that holds Dennets memories, and everything that he identifies as or contributes to his identity were to be put in Ruels body, would the body still be Ruels if the memories that the body holds now are Dennets? Because the brain is Dennets, when the body of Ruel introduces itself, it would be using Dennets memories and identification factors in which the body of Ruel would say “I am Dennet”. Dennet can therefore be separated from Hamlet. 

“I am where Yorrick (brain) is”

FOR: In the same way that we deduced that Dennet couldnt possibly be where Hamlet is, we will also deduce that Dennet is where Yorrick is; being that when a brain is transplanted into a different body, it carries all the memories and self-identifying information that an individual needs to identify themselves in the world. If Ruel’s body with Dennet’s brain is asked to introduce itself, it would say “I am Dennet” therefore Dennet is where Yorrick is. 

AGAINST: As is the case with Dennet, he explained well in the paper what led him to the convoluted matrix of jurisdictional law in regards to a supposed crime thought by Yorrick and executed by Hamlet in different places, and who would be incarcerated. Firstly, such a question should give grounds to the government to legally identify which part of a person is the person for the simple fact that it could be possible and that is scary in itself. Secondally, the fact that Dennet was able to stand outside the vat and look at his brain (and freaked out for a bit, i might add) is grounds to say that Dennet is NOT where the physical Yorrick is. I will explain more about my thoughts on this in the next paragraph.

“I am wherever I think I am”

When Dennet set himself apart from Yorrick and Hamlet, I believe he had his answer then already. He was able to set himself apart from these two corporeal features that make up his relative identity. These 2 characteristics, Yorrick and Hamlet, were the only possible physical candidates because they were the only relative and reflexive candidates that referred back to Dennet. The truth is that no one knows Dennet, they only know the physical representation of Dennet- Dennets body and body parts, Hamlet and Yorrick. Dennet is wherever he is conscious and aware. Consciousness does not have a material form, which is why he couldn’t find it in Hamlet and Yorrick. It would be too far sighted to say that the self-identifying consciousness has an immaterial form outside of our physical wakefulness without having an explanation, but at the same time- that would also be the best explanation for where consciousness could possibly be.

WHAT IS THE SELF?

     

Zahavi’s minimal self v. Damasio’s “core self,” v. Albahari’s “Wtiness Consciousness

I will provide a coherent explanation of my understanding between the distinction between 3 thinkers' conception of the self: Zahavi’s minimal self, Damasio’s core self, and Albahari’s witness consciousness.

To start with, I’de familiarize that the minimal self is the general subject of experience, and the narrative self the mechanism of said subject that makes sense of experience, gives perception and is also the entity that enables the sense of ownership over such experiences and thoughts that come from it. Zahavi frames the minimal self as the outcome of the narrative self, introducing an insight where one’s perception and thoughts construct the experience. Instead of a receiving and perceiving model of consciousness within selfhood, he theorizes a consciousness that makes sense of an experience, resulting in the minimal self. Namely, the minimal self is the less engaged self within consciousness and the narrative self the one doing the engaging. In simpler words, one would narrate an experience as his or her own from their perception, and what that looks like in their minds and within their visualization/perception is the minimal self. I assume that he does this to utilize the complexity of what we refer to as the self. To say that our selfhood is the subject of an experience is much easier than to say that our selfhood constructs said experiences. In fact, with the understanding that our selfhood indeed constructs our experiences enables the opportunity to study the complexity of the self and all that it entails as a framework. 

Damasio’s “core self” is also a framework that I find interesting, because it is very much based in both neurological and philosophical science. To simplify, the core self, as Damasio defined, is the primal center of human beings as an entity that stores information, which our perception, thoughts and mechanisms of the autobiographical self does not influence. Damasio also talks of a “core consciousness,” which from my understanding should be different from the “core self.” The core consciousness is the expression for our moment-to-moment sense of being an awake and experiencing subject. For example, one whose “core self” is deconstructed and isn't able to retain information, would still have an active core consciousness as long as they are awake, responsive and aware of themselves. The core consciousness is more or less the self-consciousness in its casual and popular implication. I can understand Damasio’s framework if I refer to the “core self” as the I, that despite its declaration of doing many things, is not actually the one doing them. It might be the I’s hands or the I’s lips or the I’s brain, but the I itself is omnipresent; yet if the lips who do the speaking were to declare who is speaking, it would say “I am speaking”. I is always there, but can never be found, I owns the credit to the agency of the entity. Who is the I, or more fundamentally- what and where is the I, or in Damasio’s words- the core self, that is uninfluenced by its extended narratives? To a certain extent, Damasio and Zahavi aren't necessarily talking about different versions of selves, but more so different levels. I perceive that Damasio concentrates on an understanding of the self that resides within the framework of the mental psyche, while Zahavi frameworks his conception within the metaphysical setting where the minimal and narrative self interact. 

Then comes Albahari, who the authors of this paper so far as we have read, seems to all disagree with on one point or another. Albahari describes the self as the “witness consciousness”, describing the subject in which experience, thoughts and perceptions is given to, further creating the perspectival owner; Unline Damasio’s core self, this witness consciousness seems to be there just to witness, it is not the retainer of information, it is not the processor of thought or perception, and it is not the narrative-maker; in other words, it has no agency nor does it seem like it does. It is simply the interface of a subject which experiences happen to, like a computer screen that hosts colors and pixels that a user interacts with- but the screen itself is just a piece of glass that does nothing, and in that sense- it is somewhat similar to Damasio’s “core self”. Albahari denies the existence of the self in general, what she does accept is that there are extensions of our consciousness that interact in a way where we are illusioned by a sense of self.

To compare these three thinkers and distinguish them from each other, I will use a computer model. In Zahavi’s framework, the minimal self would be the general computer that a user makes something of or uses for something. Without a user (narrative), the computer isn’t anything other than a pile of metal, with limitless potential. With a user, the computer becomes an extension of the user's intentions, purposes, preferences, and narratives. In Damasio’s framework, the core self would be the CPU (central processing unit). It is ultimately what the term “computer” refers to. Yet while it is necessary and while it is what makes the computer, it is not influenced by the functions of said computer, the software. Software would be the programs and functions that users actually use, and this does not influence the CPU. Even though when we refer to “computer,” we are technically referring to the CPU and never the software unless we specify the software, we (users) do not actually use the CPU, we use the software and the software is the one that does the jobs for us. In Albahari’s “witness consciousness,” her terminology can be symbolized by the screen interface between a software powered by the CPU and its user. Its just there to witness the user and the used and nothing else. In this computer model, I am able to understand the fluidity of the three thinkers' philosophies and how they don’t contradict each other but instead talks about different aspects of the same topic. Could they all fit complementary and theoretically together into one complete theory? Possibly, with some clarification and details into the extension of self and all it entails.

Does the Buddha believe in the Self?

Within the Buddhist faith, I have discovered that perhaps the existence of a self does not matter, but rather the accessibility to this otherwise pre-supposed (or not) self. The Buddhist argument against self isn’t necessarily that it doesn’t exist or that it does. I don't think that its existence matters too much, more than the accessibility of it. The reason why I have this thought is because the Buddhist deny that the self exists yet they also insist that it is there to be detached from. Therefore, I thought to myself perhaps its existence or lack of, does not matter- but in fact what matters to the Buddhist is to give up accessibility to that sense of self that is constructed by the ego and ties our consciousness to worldly desires and simple greed. I don’t think the Buddhist knows if there is a self or not; I think that the philosophy of Buddha acts as a coping mechanism of how to live without suffering, highlighted by its 4 noble truths referencing the causes of suffering and the path to ending it. The reason why it seems like a coping mechanism is through the story of Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama) himself and how much he hated that there is suffering in the world, and also because most of the Buddhist practices and teachings highlights the ideal livelihood where we do not suffer because we detach ourselves from that which lead us to suffering in the world, desire and greed: the ego’s products. Perhaps when the Buddha say that the self does not exist and that it does, maybe they mean that the ego exists instead. Regardless, my stance is that whether this self exists hardly matters in Buddhism, much less than the priority of losing access to that sense of self (the ego).

SELF V. CONSCIOUSNESS

In order to truly understand what the witness consciousness is, I stated this premise. "I don't remember something that I forgot, how do I know that I forgot that thing?" When you think of your memories as a stream of visions, and one of those visions is missing because you don't remember- it should just be a blank space. Yet, you KNOW that you forgot it, as if something else is watching over the stream of visions that is which is your memories. The thing inside our consciousness that tells us we forgot something is the witness consciousness, the entity that is only aware of itself.

Jonardon Ganeri 

    Manas is the mind that is associated with thinking (manana). This transforms into what we call the “self”, as a work of “cognitive fabrication.” Cognitive fabrication refers to possible errors made by our perceptions and influenced by our beliefs. This is most understandable to me by Descartes' distrust of his senses. To cognitively fabricate something, our mind requires information gathered by our senses and perceptions. This implies the possibility that the reality we sense and perceive might be the error/fabrication instead of our cognition.. 

Ganeri explains extensively how subjectivity or first-person-ness/mineness presents itself through thoughts, implying that this mineness is inherent with thought, and not fabricated by the mind’s processing. In this sense, “I” refers to something that already and only knows itself. There is no representation of myself in my mind as an object nor a subject because that would lead to error due to misidentification. “I” surely only knows itself, and absolves from any error about its own subjectivity and nothing else. 

Paul Schwiezer on Advaita Vedanta on Philosophy of Consciousness without an Object.

   Paul argued that consciousness without an object is deemed conceptually impossible. I cannot help but think that even so, it doesn’t negate the idea of a pure consciousness- in fact, it might even support the idea. Pure consciousness isn’t an object, it could be a substance, but I also think it could be space, dimensional space. Its unobservable, and conceptually impossible to imagine objectless, but all it is could just be space. I might label this theoretical space as the self and cross examine it with Buddhism and it would still make sense, in the way that the self doesnt have matter to Buddha, the ego does. Nirvana is the transcendent state where the human isn’t influenced by his ego anymore and is believed to not be reborn again. They awake to the real reality. The “self” itself does not really matter. The self does not have matter. Space. Nothingness. Objectless Space that is unobservable and conceptually impossible to imagine, which is probably why the Buddha never imagined what lies after nirvana. 

Then again, these are all inferences I am making on my own to try to understand how all these seemingly contradicting philosophies somehow all make sense to me. 

Concluding Thoughts

    Ganeri also supports this idea in a way. He focuses on the autonomy of the mind, and less of the theoretical. However, he also does end up making inferences to something else too. He, alongside Buddhism, infer that the autonomy of the mind, whether its the self, the ego, or the ultimate first person-ness that presents itself, all require support, in order to be aware of itself- like a mirror I would use to be able to see myself. Within Ganeri’s article, he makes many parallels. Vasubandhu’s concept of a transforming manas to Recanti’s evolution of ego as well as defined the differences. He ventured into the autonomy of “I” as a referent. I agree with Ganeri when he supports that I is a disingenuous reference. I think that if it were a metonymy, we wouldn’t be able to all use “I” and simultaneously refer to different individuals without having to identify who. It is a disingenuous reference especially because everybody is able to use it and not have to explain who it is referring to. I might even entertain the idea that I refer to the space I talked about previously and that space is one, in which all supposed identity is tied to. Our sense of individualism when we employ the use of “I” is constructed by our observable realities in addition to our inherent first-person-ness, but what if “I” refers to only a single agent/entity that supports and manifests itself to each individual.

CONSCIOUSNESS & THE SELF

                                                                    Advaita Vedanta

    Advaita Vedanta breaks down the distinction between a witness consciousness and the experiencing consciousness, not necessarily by making them one and the same but from my understanding, identifying their placements. Advaita Vedanta explains that our thoughts appear to our consciousness, and by extension, our individuality or sense of it at the least. The witness consciousness never needs to distinguish itself from another, it only knows itself in the same sense that “I” as a referent knows no one else but itself. The more I think about this, I’m coming to understand “the self” completely differently from how I used to. Here goes: the self is just a function of the witness consciousness. The witness consciousness is the actual subject of all experience. Our sense of individuality that appears to our consciousness is where the elusive self is typically referred to but like all constructs, it is just a function of the witness consciousness. There is no self as a subject, because the only subject is the Witness Consciousness, The Matter, The Unobservable Reality, whatever it is, etc. If the Witness Consciousness is the only subject then there is no individuality either- that becomes just another function of W.C being the subject of all experience. To clarify, Reul and David are two different individuals of the same witness consciousness, their individual selves are not subjects but functions of W.C experiencing the observable reality, and nothing more. Consider that scenario between all the people in existence. If everyone is simply a living function of experiencing for the W.C then our alluded sense of individualism is simply serving its purpose by existing, no matter what we do or what we think we're doing. In that sense, there is no real distinction between oneself or another. 

In coming to that conclusion for this session, I can understand the concept of moderation better- that moderation is the closest we can come to finding our sense of self. Anything more than that and we end up wasting our efforts, like dogs chasing their tails, and upon pushing forward, we risk insanity. 

In what sense is such a self "elusive"? 

The self is elusive in the way that you cannot find it. As subjective experiencers, we employ this agency of self commonly, and like a construct created by our awareness- we know exactly what we mean but we can never know what the self is. The closest we can come to identifying the self is through semantics and the usage of language, because it is difficult for something to identify itself, it's like asking a mirror to mirror itself. It will never see itself, only the reflection of its context, only proving its existence as a function and not what it is. Perhaps, its identity is proven when it serves its functions, and trying to self-identify is simply not one of those functions and therefore, impossible. Almost there, and never there- one step away from either the truth or mental insanity. We need constructs and context to piece together our subjectiveness. To look for our “self” is to take apart that subjectiveness, and it's impossible because it's arguably the only thing we are. In a way, the self is not a subject but a verb, a function of existence, more than simply a referent.

JadeVictoria Lukan